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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point One
Ms. Olson urges that Mr. Jensen should be required to marshal the
evidence in favor of the lower court's findings. However, as will be discussed
below, Mr. Jensen's appeal addresses the legal sufficiency of the lower court's
conclusions of law, and the court's failure to make findings of material facts.
Therefore, marshaling is not required or even appropriate.
Point Two
Ms. Olson argues that the court below committed harmless error when it
failed to make a finding as to the ownership of the business. Ms. Olson
suggests that such findings, at least with regard to Clara Jensen's shares, are
implied in the division of property contained in the conclusions of law and that
the error is harmless. However, as will be discussed below, Ms. Olson fails to
confront that the court's conclusions of law imply away, not just Clara Jensen's
ownership in the company, but also Mark Jensen's ownership. While the proper
ownership of Clara Jensen's shares was at least under some debate, Mark
Jensen's status as an equity holder in the company was never disputed and,
while the court below never got around to pegging his ownership with any
3

specificity, the court seems to recognize in its findings of fact that he owns at
least some substantial number of shares. By failing to make findings on
material facts, the court committed reversible error.
Point Three
Ms. Olson asserts that it was within the court's discretion to determine
that the entire increase in company equity was marital property. However, as
will be discussed below, while the court makes no findings on the material
facts regarding company ownership, it seems to recognize that some substantial
equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen. Furthermore, the court's findings
regarding Clara Jensen's shares are not clearly stated. It is not within the
court's discretion to determine that equity ascribable to shares belonging to
third parties is marital property. By determining that the entire increase in
company equity was marital property, the court committed a reversible error.
Point Four
Ms. Olson admits that the court awarded attorneys fees in the case
without making required inquiry or findings. However, Ms. Olsen asserts the
failure was harmless error. In awarding attorney's fees the trial court must
consider the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The court below did none of
4

these things.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for Mr, Jensen to marshal the
evidence as his appeal does not challenge a finding of fact
Ms. Olsen urges that Mr. Jensen should be required to marshal the
evidence in favor of the lower court's findings. However, Mr. Jensen's appeal
does not seek to challenge a finding of fact, but rather, addresses the legal
sufficiency of the lower court's conclusions of law, and the court's failure to
make findings of material facts. Therefore, marshaling is not required or even
appropriate.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) requires that "A party
challenging a fact finding must marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." As will be discussed below, Mr. Jensen's appeal asserts
that the lower court failed to make findings on material facts regarding
ownership interests in the company, and that it acted outside of its discretion
when it determined that the entire increase in company equity was marital
property. These are issues of law and do not constitute a challenge of a fact
5

finding. It is difficult to see how a marshaling of evidence would even apply to
these legal challenges.
Nevertheless, Ms. Olson asserts that the application of the legal
standards here are so highly fact sensitive as to require Mr. Jensen to marshal
the evidence. Appellee's Brief, p. 6. Ms. Olsen also asserts that sufficient
findings on the material issue of equity ownership in the company can be
implied by the court's ultimate judgment. Mr. Jensen disagrees, but is willing,
since Ms. Olsen raises the issue, to conduct the exercise here and demonstrate
that the court's errors of law are in no way mitigated by a recitation of
evidence.
The court below determined that the entire increase in company equity
was marital property. Ms. Olsen asserts that a finding that Mr. Jensen was
deemed owner of Clara Jensen's shares can fairly be implied from this
judgment. But even if this is true, the judgment still fails to take into
consideration Mark Jensen's equity ownership. While the court fails to make
findings on material facts regarding Mark Jensen's ownership interests in the
company, as will be discussed below, the court seems to recognize that Mark
Jensen is an owner of some substantial portion of the company. If that is the
case, then some part of the increase in the company's equity would be
6

ascribable to his shares. The increase in equity ascribable to Mark Jensen's
shares would properly belong to Mark Jensen and any judgment deeming that
increase to be marital property would be in error as a matter of law.
The court heard testimony that disclosure statements in the company's
Form 1120 corporate tax return list Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen as each
owning half the company. Trial Tr. July 31, 2006, p. 16,1. 17- p. 17,1. 4. The
court heard testimony that Clara Jensen assigned all of her shares, half each, to
Mr. Jensen and to Mark Jensen and the court took as evidence stock certificates
noting these assignments. Id. at p.30,1. 10-p.32,1. 3. The court heard
testimony from Clara Jensen that the shares are Mr. Jensen's and Mark
Jensen's inheritance. Id at p. 117,11. 19-21.
Ms. Olsen asserts that this represents more than a "scintilla" of evidence
supporting an implied finding by the trial court that Mr. Jensen is one-half
owner of the company. But even if Ms. Olsen is right, it still does not support
the trial court's judgment that all of the increase in company equity is marital
property. Appellee's Brief, pp. 8-9.
Ms. Olson repeatedly points to the possibility that the court impliedly
found that Mr. Jensen owns some part of Clara Jensen's equity, as though that
would justify the court's judgment that all the increase in equity is marital
7

property. However, Ms. Olson persistently ignores the court's findings that
indicate at least some substantial equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen.
And, as will be discussed below, to the extent Mark Jensen - who is not, after
all, a party to the divorce - retains an equity ownership, the court was in error
when it determined an increase in equity ascribable to his shares is marital
property.
There simply is no evidence supporting a finding that all of the increase
in company equity is marital property. In fact, while it declines to make
specific findings on the issue, the court itself seems to recognize that Mark
Jensen is an owner of some substantial portion of the company equity. The
court found that in 1980, 20,000 shares were owned by Delbert Jensen and his
wife Clara Jensen, 20,000 shares were owned by Arnell Jensen and his wife
Norine Jensen, and 10,000 shares were held as treasury stock. Supp. Findings
of Fact, ^f 32. The court found that Arnell Jensen's stock was subsequently
assigned to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen as tenants in common. Id. at % 38. The
court found that in 1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were divided
equally among Mr. Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at f 39. The
court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares passed to his
wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at 140. The court found that in 1999 Clara Jensen
8

assigned some of her shares to Mr. Jensen and the rest of her shares to Mark
Jensen. Id at f 42.
Thus, even the court's own findings mitigate against a judgment that all
the increase in equity is marital property, never mind the evidence supporting
those findings.
POINT II
By failing to make findings on material facts, the court committed a
reversible error of law
Ms. Olson argues that the court below committed harmless error when it
failed to make a finding as to the ownership of the business. However, the trial
court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah CtApp. 1987). The findings
must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal
the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented.
Id
The trial court heard evidence concerning ownership of the company.
Trial Tr., July 31,2006, pp. 4-136. The court found that in 1980 the total
9

number of shares in the company was 50,000. Supp. Findings of Fact, f 31.
The court found that in 1980, 20,000 shares were owned by Delbert Jensen and
his wife Clara Jensen, 20,000 shares were owned by Amell Jensen and his wife
Norine Jensen, and 10,000 shares were held as treasury stock. Id. at \ 32. The
court found that Amell Jensen's stock was subsequently assigned to Mr. Jensen
and Mark Jensen as tenants in common. Id. at f 38. The court found that in
1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were divided equally among Mr.
Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at \ 39.
The court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares
passed to his wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at f 40. The court heard testimony from
the company's tax accountant that, according the tax accountant's records, Mr.
Jensen and Mark Jensen each own 11 percent of the company's shares and
Clara Jensen owns 78 percent. Trial Tr. July 31,2006, p. 12,11. 19-21. The
court found that in 1999 Clara Jensen assigned some of her shares to Mr.
Jensen and the rest of her shares to Mark Jensen. Id. at f 42. The court found
that Clara Jensen assigned her shares to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen to protect
her assets and that Clara Jensen testified that the shares are Mr. Jensen's and
Mark Jensen's inheritance and that the assignment would become a transfer to
them upon her death. Id. atfflf44-45.
10

The court made no specific findings as to the ultimate ownership of the
company. It would seem logical from the findings discussed above that the
court recognized Mark Jensen as an owner of corporate equity. However, the
court said that the increase in the total equity in the company is marital
property and accordingly divided the increase in total equity in the company
between Mr. Jensen and Ms. Olson. Supp. Conclusions of Law,fflf22, 23.
Ms. Olson suggests that findings, at least with regard to Clara Jensen's
shares, are implied in the division of property contained in the conclusions of
law and that the error is harmless. However, Ms. Olson fails to confront that
the court's conclusions of law imply away, not just Clara Jensen's ownership in
the company, but also Mark Jensen's ownership. While the proper ownership
of Clara Jensen's shares was at least under some debate, Mark Jensen's status
as an equity holder in the company was never disputed and, while the court
below never got around to pegging his ownership with any specificity, the
court seems to recognize in its findings of fact that he owns at least some
substantial number of shares.
As argued in Appellant's Brief, to the extent the court deemed as marital
property equity that properly belongs to third parties, the court has committed a
reversible error of law. Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-9. The trial court failed to
11

make findings on the material issue of company ownership, and its failure to do
so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment. However, the fact of Mark Jensen's ownership of at least some
equity, which the court seems to recognize, though it makes no specific finding
on the issue, would not support the court's judgment in which it deemed the
entire increase in the company's equity as marital property.
In support of her contention that the court committed harmless error
when it failed to make findings concerning company ownership, Ms. Olson
sites to Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. JWCJR, 1999 UT App 91, 977 P.2d
541 (Utah CtApp. 1999), for the proposition that harmless error can occur
where the unstated findings can be reasonably implied.
In Colonial Pacific the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a judgment
enforcing a lease agreement, concluding that the court's findings of fact were
insufficient to support its judgment. Id. at f 1. In Colonial Pacific, an
autobody shop sought a computer system from a vender. Id. at*[[ 2 Under a
finance lease agreement, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. purchased the system
from the vendor then leased it to the autobody shop. Id. Before the autobody
shop received the computer system, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. Required
12

the autobody shop owner to sign an "acceptance and acknowledgment" form.
Id. After the autobody shop received the computer system, Colonial Pacific
Leasing Corp. called the autobody shop and obtained a verbal verification that
the computer system was acceptable. Matfflf3,4. Later that day the computer
system crashed and after several days of unsuccessfully trying to get it to work
the autobody shop returned it to the vendor. Id. at 1 5 . Colonial Pacific
Leasing Corp. sought to recover the unpaid lease payments and the trial judge
concluded that the autobody shop had breached the lease agreement by failing
to make the required lease payments. Idat % 6,
In concluding that the trial court had failed to make findings of fact on
the pivotal issue of whether the autobody shop had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the computer system, the court said, "It is well settled that the trial court
should make findings on all material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to
do so is generally considered reversible error and requires a remand." Id at f
17 (Citations omitted).
However, the court went on to say that a trial court's decision may be
affirmed if the failure to make the missing findings can be viewed as harmless
error. Id. (Citations omitted). Harmless error can occur two ways: First, if the
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which the
13

findings are missing or, second, even given controverted evidence, if the absent
findings can reasonably be implied. Id
According to that court, unstated findings can be implied if it is
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted
evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but simply
failed to record the factual determination it made. Mat f 18 (citation omitted).
However, findings of fact may not be implied when the ambiguity of the facts
makes such an assumption unreasonable. Id. (Citation omitted). The court said
that "we will not imply a missing finding where there is a matrix of possible
factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court's actual findings." Id.
(quotations and citation omitted).
Under Ms. Olson's rational, the appeals court in Colonial Pacific would
have concluded that the trial court's judgment against the autobody shop
contained an implicit finding that the autobody shop had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the computer system. However, the court rejected that
rationale on the grounds that the facts were disputed and "not capable of
supporting only a finding" of acceptance. Mat % 19.
As in Colonial Pacific, the facts here were disputed and are not capable
of supporting only a finding that the entire increase in the company's equity is
14

marital property. Moreover, the facts specifically found by the court indicating
an equity ownership belonging to Mark Jensen do not support a finding that the
entire increase in the company's equity is marital property.
Furthermore, the court's judgment that the entire increase in the
company's equity is marital property does not support Ms. Olson's contention
that "it is reasonable to assume that the trial court found that Mr. Jensen was a
one-half owner o f the company. The court's judgment would seem instead to
assume that Mr. Jensen was the sole owner of the company.
It is inconceivable that the court intended to strip Mark Jensen of all, or
even any, equity ownership in the company. However, as discussed above,
while the court's findings of fact seem to recognize Mark Jensen as an equity
holder, the court's judgment that the entire increase in company equity is
marital property would seem to assume away entirely Mark Jensen's equity
ownership.
It is too much, given the court's schizophrenic treatment of Mark
Jensen's equity ownership, to simply assume, as Ms. Olson would have it, that
the court's "findings" regarding Clara Jensen's stock ownership are clearly
implied by the court's judgment that the entire increase in equity is marital
property. Not only are the relevant facts in dispute as they were in Colonial
15

Pacific, but the facts are not capable of supporting only a finding that the entire
increase in the company's equity was marital property. On the contrary, it
seems that the facts are not at all capable of supporting the finding that the
entire increase in company equity is marital property.
POINT HI
Because there were other owners of company equity besides Mr. Jensen, it
was not within the court's discretion to determine that the entire increase
in company equity was marital property
The court below ruled that the increase in the adjusted total equity of the
company is marital property and divided it accordingly. Supplemental
Conclusions of Law, ff 22, 23. Ms. Olson asserts that it was within the court's
discretion to determine that the entire increase in company equity was marital
property. Marital assets encompass all of the assets of every nature possessed
by the parties. Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah CtApp. 1996)
(Citing Englertv. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978)). Possession
connotes not only physical possession, but also legal possession. Id. Here,
neither of the parties has physical or legal possession of some part of the
increase in company equity that the court found to be marital property.
As was discussed in Point II above, while the court declined to make a
16

specific finding as to Mark Jensen's equity ownership in the company, it seems
nevertheless to recognize that Mark Jensen owns at least some portion of the
equity. The court found for instance that Arnell Jensen's stock was assigned to
Mr, Jensen and Mark Jensen as tenants in common, Supp. Findings of Fact, f
38. The court also found that in 1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were
divided equally among Mr. Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at f
39. The court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares
passed to his wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at f 40. The court found that in 1999
Clara Jensen assigned some of her shares to Mr. Jensen and the rest of her
shares to Mark Jensen. Id. at f 42.
While the court made no specific findings as to the ultimate ownership of
the company, it would seem logical from the findings discussed above that the
court recognized Mark Jensen as an owner of corporate equity. However, the
court said that the increase in the total equity in the company is marital
property and accordingly divided the increase in total equity in the company
between Mr. Jensen and Ms. Olson. Supp. Conclusions of Law,fflf22, 23.
Also as discussed in Point II above, Ms. Olson urges that the court's
determination that all the increase in the company's equity is marital property
supports her contention that the court implies that one-half ownership of the
17

company resides in Mr. Jensen. However, as discussed in Point II above, this
does not follow. A determination that all of the increase in equity is marital
property would rather support an implication that the court deems there are no
other owners of equity besides Mr. Jensen (or, perhaps Mr. Jensen and Ms.
Olson - however there appears to be no suggestion from any quarter that Ms.
Olson is an owner of equity).
Ms. Olson asserts that Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct.App.
1996) is inapposite, claiming its holding that marital assets must be legally
possessed by one or both of the parties pertains only to assets held in a trust
created by third parties. This pinched view ignores the court's broadly
constructed rule of the case: "[F]or assets to be distributed, the assets must be
in the possession of one, or both, of the marital parties....[MJarital assets
encompass all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties. While
possession usually connotes physical possession, we believe it also connotes
legal possession." Enrody, 914 P.2d at 1169 (citations omitted).
Enrody involved an appeal from a divorce decree. At issue was an intervivos trust into which had been transferred various parties' interests in a family
ranch. Id. at 1168. Beneficiaries of the trust included the parties to the
divorce, their children, and various other members of the extended family. Id.
18

Ms. Enrody, who had filed for divorce, was divested of her shares in the trust
pursuant to its terms. Id. The trial court denied Ms. Enrody's claims against
the trust, but found that Mr. Enrody's shares in the trust were marital property.
Id. In concluding that Ms. Enrody was not entitled to a distribution of the assets
held in the trust, the Utah Court of Appeals said, 'the equitable powers of the
trial court do not allow the distribution of assets that are not in the legal
possession of the divorcing parties. Id. at 1171-72.
As in enrody, the present case involves assets not in the legal possession
of the divorcing parties. Ms. Olson repeatedly points to the possibility that the
court impliedly found that Mr. Jensen owns Clara Jensen's equity. However,
Ms. Olson persistently ignores the court's findings that indicate at least some
substantial equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen. To the extent the court
finds ownership with Mark Jensen (and to the extent the court fails to make
findings on the material issue of Clara Jensen's ownership), it is not within the
court's discretion to determine that the entire increase in company equity was
marital property.
POINT IV
It was not within the trial court's discretion to awarded attorney fees
without considering need, ability to pay, or reasonableness
19

The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ms. Olsen. However, the trial
court made no inquiry nor findings concerning Ms. Olsen's financial need, Mr.
Jensen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees. Ms. Olsen admits the
court failed to make required findings to support its award but she asserts that
the court's failure is harmless error. Appellee's Brief, p. 19.
In awarding attorney fees, the trial court must consider the receiving
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees. Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d, 171, 2000 UT
App 236,^30 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). A trial court's findings of fact must show
that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by,
the evidence. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). The findings
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). A trial court's failure to provide adequate findings is
reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record. See id. at 1334-35
(vacating an alimony award and remanding for adequate findings).
Ms. Olsen points to no authority for the proposition that a court may
20

dispense with the required findings in awarding attorneys fees, but points to
Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp., 1999 Utah Ct.App. 91, 977 P.2d 541, a
financing lease case, to support her contention that the court's award of
attorneys fees itself renders it reasonable to imply unstated findings.
Appellee's Brief, p. 19.
Ms. Olsen asserts that the court's finding that Mr. Jensen had a higher
income than Ms. Olsen should serve as reasonable inference of a finding of Ms.
Olsen's financial need and Mr. Jensen's ability to pay. However, a simple
finding that Mr. Jensen makes more than Ms. Olsen does not constitute
sufficiently detailed findings or subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusions on the factual issues were reached concerning Ms.
Olsen's financial need OR Mr. Jensen's ability to pay.
Similarly, Ms. Olsen asserts that an affidavit of fees submitted by Ms.
Olsen's attorney, stating the fees were reasonable, ought to serve as inference
that the court considered and found the fees to be reasonable. In both this
assertion and the assertion discussed above concerning ability and need, Ms.
Olsen essentially argues that the court's award of attorney fees ought to be
taken as reasonably implying that the required findings were made. But this
assertion ignores the requirement that findings be sufficiently detailed and
21

include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion was reached.
Here, there are no findings, much less findings sufficiently detailed to
disclose the steps the court took in making the required inquiry concerning Ms.
Olsen's financial need, Mr. Jensen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the
fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court's award to Ms. Jensen of the
increase in the value of the company stock and attorney fees should be
reversed. Appellant, Mr. Jensen, asks for an award of attorneys fees
incurred on appeal.
DATED this

/C7
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DouglasX. Neeley (#629

22

